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A vast literature has examined the impact of family income on the health and development 
outcomes of children. One channel through which increased income may operate is an 
improvement in a family’s ability to provide food, shelter, clothing, books, and other 
expenditure-related inputs to a child’s development.  In addition to this channel, many 
scholars   have   investigated   the  relationship   between   income   and   the   psychological 
wellbeing of the family.  By reducing stress and conflict, more income helps to foster an 
environment more conducive to healthy child development. In this paper, we exploit 
changes in child benefits in Canada to study these questions. Importantly, our approach 
allows us to make stronger causal inferences than has been possible with the existing, 
mostly correlational, evidence. Using variation in child benefits across province, time, and 
family type, we study outcomes spanning test scores, mental health, physical health, and 
deprivation measures. The findings suggest that child benefit programs in Canada had 
significant positive effects on test scores, as has been featured in the existing literature. 
However, we also find that several measures of both child and maternal mental health and 
well-being show marked improvement with higher child benefits. We find strong and 
interesting differences in the effects of benefits by sex of the child: benefits have stronger 
effects on educational outcomes and physical health for boys, and on mental health 
outcomes for girls. Our findings also provide some support for the hypothesis that income 




Since the 1990s, many countries have reformed their systems of transfers to low-
income families with an eye toward improving work incentives—helping people 
make a transition from welfare to work. Empirical evidence on transfer programs 
such as the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US or the Working Tax Credit in the 
UK, appears to be surprisingly robust. Well-designed transfer systems can have 
a strong influence on parents’ choice to work or not. This focus on welfare-to-
work, however, seems to have diminished the attention paid to another important 
goal of well-designed transfer systems—improving the wellbeing of recipient 
families. 
 
How does extra income affect family wellbeing? 
 
Researchers and policy-makers have long been interested in figuring out the 
effect of income—or the lack of income—on families and children. The eternal 
problem for this research, however, was trying to establish causal relationships. 
Some of the same factors that might lead people to have lower income (impaired 
mental or physical health; a troubled childhood; lesser mental or physical 
capacity; less ambition or drive) might also lead their families to experience more 
problems. For this reason it has been difficult to attribute causally the family 
problems to the income shortfalls. 
 
Of late, several researchers have found ways to overcome this empirical 
challenge through creative use of data. The primary focus of much of this 
scholarship has been education outcomes—and test scores specifically. Blau 
(1999), for example, finds that $10,000 of income leads to around a ¼ standard 
deviation increase in test scores. Dahl and Lochner (2008) find bigger results, 
with a $10,000 increase leading to an increase of about 60% of a standard 
deviation in test scores. 
 
While convincing, this work is somewhat limited by the narrowness of the 
outcomes considered. Increased family income could improve children’s 
outcomes through at least two distinct channels. First, direct investments of new 
money in education (books, educational toys, tutoring) could improve long-run 
child outcomes. The developmental psychology literature has referred to this as 
the ‘resources’ channel (Yeung et al, 2002), and this has been the primary focus 
of most economic analysis. But the lack of income in a family might lead to 
aggravation, stress, and more troubled relations among family members. These 
environmental conditions could affect children’s long-run wellbeing by impairing 
their emotional, physical, and academic development. This channel is called the 





Evidence from the Canadian child benefit system 
 
We address the impact of increased transfers to poorer families on children’s and 
families’ outcomes. Our study brings two advantages. First, we study Canadian 
children over a time period in which transfers to families underwent substantial 
reform; reform that differed through time, across provinces, and across family 
types. This extent of policy variation is useful because it allows us to examine the 
impact of extra family income by comparing similar families who happen to live in 
different provinces or are studied in different years. The second advantage of our 
study is that we have available a large and detailed survey, the National 
Longitudinal Study of Children and Youth (NLSCY), which allows us to broaden 
our focus to include several measures indicative of an active ‘family process’ 
channel. 
 
We have results in three spheres. First, we find that an extra $1,000 of child 
benefits leads to an increase of about 0.07 of a standard deviation in the math 
scores and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, a standard measure of 
language ability for young children ages four through six. These findings are of 
the same magnitude as the Dahl and Lochner (2008) study mentioned earlier, 
which helps to corroborate their result. Second, we examine the impact of child 
benefits on indicators of mental and emotional wellbeing using standardized 
psychometric scores available in the NLSCY. We find that more child benefit 
income leads to lower aggression in children and decreases in depression scores 
for mothers. Finally, for physical health we find little evidence of improvements 
related to increased child benefits—although we do find a decrease in families 
reporting their children have been hungry due to lack of food. 
 
We also break down our results by gender, finding stark differences across boys 
and girls. In general, we find that girls seem to show greater response on the 
mental health and behavioural scores while boys show greater response on test 
scores. This certainly suggests that the channels through which benefit income 
helps these families may indeed be different for boys than for girls. 
 
Finding that benefit income can improve the emotional and mental health of 
children is not only important for child health. Recent research by Currie and 
Stabile (2008) and Currie, Stabile, Manivong, and Roos (2008) shows that 
improvements in child mental health lead to long-term academic success, which 
is strongly correlated with improved earnings.  
 
Implications for policy 
  
Our research suggests that well-designed income transfers can not only help 
families make their way back to employment, but also improve the educational, 
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A primary tool for addressing child poverty and increasing the chances for children 
to succeed in school, and subsequently the labor market, is income transfers to families 
with children. Almost all developed countries either have direct child benefits or target 
welfare/social assistance benefits at families with children. These benefits are meant to 
help achieve several goals. First, by investing in children of lesser means, society aims to 
provide these children with opportunities to be well-adjusted and productive members of 
society, with improved educational, and later, labor market outcomes. Second, benefit 
programs allow society to help achieve distributional and equity goals regardless of the 
future returns of these transfer programs. 
Child benefit programs, as well as social assistance programs that target groups 
such as single parents with young families, transfer income to expand the budget set of 
qualifying families. There are several potential mechanisms through which this expansion 
of family budgets may improve outcomes for children. On the one hand, families may 
simply use the income to purchase more goods and services, including those goods that are 
valuable in maintaining basic child welfare and also for enhanced child development (food, 
clothing, books, etc). On the other hand, income transfers may have indirect effects such as 
reducing stress and improving household relations, increasing the chance and opportunities 
for employment, and others, which, while not goods and services purchased with the extra 
income, may benefit family members, including children, and therefore improve their 
ability to function, learn, and improve themselves. 
1These two channels are explored in Mayer (1997) and Yeung et al (2002), among 
others, and we borrow terminology from the previous literature here. Direct purchases of 
resources useful for child development is called the ‘resources’ channel. Improved family 
relations and emotional well-being is called the ‘family process’ channel. While the 
majority of the economic literature has focused on the resources channel, our paper instead 
examines the effects of benefit programs on a wide range of child outcomes which fall 
naturally under the family process channel. Recent research (Currie and Stabile, 2008; 
Currie, Stabile, Manivong and Roos, 2008) has documented  a strong relationship between 
early child mental health and not only short term educational achievement, but longer-term 
economic outcomes such as welfare take-up. 
 The paper offers two main contributions to the previous work in this area. First, it 
uses an exogenous source of child benefit income based solely on legislative variation 
rather than the observed income or other choices made by the family. Second, it uses a 
detailed Canadian survey of child well-being that includes several important outcomes of 
interest spanning test scores, mental health, physical health, and poverty measures.  This 
survey allows a more rigorous examination of the family process channel than has been 
explored in previous work.
Our findings suggest that child benefit programs in Canada had significant positive 
effects on several measures of both child and maternal mental health and well-being, as 
well as a few measures of child physical health. Our findings provide some support for the 
hypothesis that income transfers operate through the family process channel, specifically 
through measures of emotional well-being and development.  We find less evidence of 
direct effects of child benefits on test scores.  Interestingly, we find strong differences in 
2the outcomes improved by child benefits by the sex of the child. For boys, benefits have 
much stronger effects on educational outcomes and physical health measures. For girls, 
benefits have much stronger effects on mental health measures. These differences suggest 
that the channels through which benefits improve outcomes may be multiple and may 
differ by gender. 
Previous work
There is an extensive literature on the broader relationship between income and 
child health and development.
1   Several difficulties make the study of this relationship 
complex, including measuring income, distinguishing between permanent or transitory 
effects, finding exogenous ways to measure income, capturing the effects of other inputs 
into this production relationship, and finding the proper outcomes to capture the potential 
effects. Further, documenting a relationship between family income and child outcomes 
does not in itself help us understand through which channels income works in order to 
achieve any measured effects. Mayer (1997) provides a thorough treatment of the 
sociological theory and developed new empirical evidence based on the NLSY, finding that 
income was not a strong determinant of long-run outcomes. Blau (1999) presents a 
discussion of these issues from an economist’s perspective and reviews much of the 
previous literature that does not deal directly with the issue of the endogeneity of income. 
Using fixed effects models and the NLSY, Blau concludes that the effects of permanent 
family income on test scores are small compared to other family and child characteristics, 
1 See an extensive review of the literature of the determinants of child wellbeing in Haveman and Wolfe 
(1995).
3leaving income transfers as a poor policy tool to improve the outcomes of low-income 
children.  
On the other hand, a more recent study by Dahl and Lochner (2005), also using the 
NLSY, finds reasonably substantial effects of income on child test scores. Dahl and 
Lochner use changes in the earned income tax credit over several years to exogenously 
identify income through fixed-effect IV models. This identification strategy relies on 
federal changes in the benefit structure of the EITC and the tax code over time as well as 
changes in labor market returns to exogenous maternal characteristics over the same time 
period, primarily education.  A key identifying assumption for this strategy, then, is that the 
educational changes over time are not correlated with other temporal changes that might 
also affect the outcomes in question.  They also restrict their attention to test scores.
A study in the child development literature by Yeung, Linver, and Brooks-Gunn 
(2002) focuses on understanding the channels through which family income matters for 
child development. The authors hypothesize and test the two channels discussed earlier in 
the introduction, being resources and family process. The authors use the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics to test these two perspectives. They find stronger evidence in support of 
the second hypothesis than the first although these results are primarily based on direct 
OLS estimates of this relationship including a wide variety of explanatory variables. So, 
while suggestive, it is difficult to draw causal inferences from this evidence.
In a Canadian study using the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth, 
Dooley and Stewart (2004) use a variety of OLS and fixed-effects models to estimate the 
relationship between family income and test sores.  The results from these models are 
similar to those found in Blau (1999) in that they find a small relationship between income 
4and test scores. They also find some limited impact of the consumption channel through 
measures of children’s activities (day camps, sports, etc.) and housing amenities.
Our work builds on this literature in a variety of ways.  First, we exploit variation 
over time, across provinces, and across number of children, to develop an exogenous 
measure of benefit income as an instrument for child benefits. Second, we are able to 
examine a variety of outcomes, including test scores, but also including a variety of 
physical and mental health measures.  As a result we are able to provide an exogenous 
estimate of the effects of benefit income on a variety of potential pathways for child 
development, and on a standard set of test score measures to capture child outcomes. 
Policy
The Canadian child benefit system consists of two main benefits. First, the Canada 
Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) is paid to parents of children age 0 to 17. This is a federal 
benefit initiated in 1993 that pays the same across the country with two small exceptions.
2 
The CCTB is payable for a twelve-month period running from July to June, with the 
amount dependent upon the reported net income of the parents in the previous calendar 
year.
3 So, the July 2005 to June 2006 maximum annual benefit of $1,228 per child was 
reduced based on reported family net income from 2004. Benefits do not depend on earned 
income specifically, so families with no income still qualify for the benefit. Take-up is high
—in   many   provinces   the   application   is   given   to   families   of   newborns   and   the 
2 In Alberta, the benefit is differentiated by age of the child. For example, in 2005 children age zero to six 
received $1,124 while those age 16 to 17 received $1,423. Until 1997, benefits paid to Quebec residents 
depended on how many children were in the family, with higher-order children receiving more benefits.
3 For 2005, the clawback threshold is $36, 378, with a reduction rate of 2.5 percent for income over that 
threshold for one-child families, and 5 percent for two or more child families.
5administration is well-integrated with the tax system so any tax filer who qualifies will be 
made aware of the transfer. The benefit level was constant in nominal dollars between 1993 
and 1999, but has been indexed to CPI inflation since 2000. A small supplement ($86 
annually in 2005) is available for a third or higher order child, and another supplement 
($243 annually in 2005) was available until 2006 for children age zero to six for those not 
claiming childcare expenses.
The second component of the child benefit system is the National Child Benefit 
program, begun in 1998.  This program is a federal-provincial initiative that features a 
federally-paid benefit called the National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS).  Provinces, at 
their discretion, could subtract the NCBS from welfare recipients in their province and use 
the ‘savings’ to fund different provincial programs and child benefits.   This yielded 
substantial differences in benefits across provinces. In addition, the province of Quebec, 
while it elected to stay outside the NCB program, instituted major reforms of its child 
benefits system in 1997 and 2005. The details of each province’s programs are provided in 
the Appendix.  In short, two provinces introduced new transfers that weren’t related to 
earnings, two provinces introduced earnings-related benefits, and three provinces did both. 
Across provinces, there were large differences in the structure of benefits across family 
size.
The net impact of these changes is a large degree of heterogeneity in child benefits 
across several dimensions:  year, province, number of children, and income.  There is no 
explicit dependence of benefits on marital status or education, but benefit levels across 
those dimensions will vary through differences in family income. Because our empirical 
strategy will attempt to exploit only the exogenous components of policy variation, we 
6concentrate primarily on three dimensions of heterogeneity (year, province, number of 
children). 
In Figure 1 we trace out the average benefits payable across time and for different 
numbers of children in each province. The main differences stem from the 1998 
introduction of the NCB program and its provincial counterparts. Some provinces, such as 
BC moved a bit earlier. Other provinces, like Prince Edward Island, had no benefit 
program and so had no province-specific variation. Across other provinces, the biggest 
differences that can be seen are for the three-child families compared to the one child 
families. We provide some more information on benefit levels later in Table 1.
Empirical Strategy
The crucial empirical challenge for estimating the impact of child benefits on 
outcomes is unobserved heterogeneity.   The solution we employ extracts plausibly 
exogenous legislative variation in benefits to remove the bias of unobserved correlates of 
child outcomes.  In particular, we use a simulated benefits approach similar to that in 
Currie and Gruber (1996).  The method involves taking a sample of families and pushing 
them through a tax and benefit simulator 400 times—once for each of the ten provinces, 
each of the ten years between 1994 and 2003, and of four family sizes (0, 1, 2, or 3 
children).  We then take the average benefit level for each of these cells. The resulting 
benefit levels differ across time periods, years, and family sizes only through differences in 
legislated benefit levels and not by income or any unobservables that may be correlated 
with income.
To calculate the benefits, we select a ten percent sample of families with children 
from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (described in more detail later) between 
7the years 1999 and 2004. These families are stripped of everything except for marital status 
and incomes—they are essentially providing nothing more than a reasonable distribution of 
incomes to use for the simulation.  The tax and benefit simulator we employ is the CTaCS 
package, which is described in detail in Milligan (2007). Importantly, the child benefits 
components of the calculator were developed by looking directly at the legislation and 
regulations for each province and coding these parameters and program rules into the 
calculator. After putting these families through the calculator, we take the mean of the 
simulated child benefits by province-year-number of children cell.
We take these simulated benefits and estimate first-stage equations of the following 
type:
pyki pyk pyki pyki SIMBEN X BEN e b b b + + + = 2 1 0 .
The indexes on the variables represent provinces (p), years (y), number of children (k), and 
families (i).  The reported child benefit levels BENpyki are predicted by the set of observable 
characteristics Xpyki and the simulated benefit level SIMBENpyk. We include not only the 
main effects of province, years, and number of children, but also the 2
nd order interactions 
of these three factors. 
The predicted values from our first-stage can then be used in a second-stage 
regression using child outcomes, taking the following form:
pyki pyki pyki pyki BEN X Outcome h a a a + + + = 2 1 0 .
The predicted value of the child benefit  pyki BEN is used to explain various child outcome 
measures  Outcomepyki. We include the same  Xpyki  characteristics in the second stage 
regression including all second order interactions. In this way, the identification of the 
impact of child benefits comes through the exclusion of the fully saturated third order 
interactions of the province, year, and number of children effects. So long as the simulated 
8benefit measure is a good (even if not perfect) predictor of actual benefits and so long as 
there are no confounding province-year-number of children trends or policies  that 
invalidate the exclusion restriction, the simulated benefit represents a valid instrument. For 
reasons made clear later, most of our results use a reduced form specification, which 
involves   inserting   the   simulated   benefit   measure   directly   in   the  outcome   variable 
regression. However, we do report some results using the full two-stage procedure.
An important challenge to this identification strategy might come from other policy 
reforms contemporaneous with the changes in child benefits.   For example, provincial 
spending programs introduced as part of the NCB program could have influenced child 
welfare. Similarly, other policy reforms such as the subsidized childcare program in 
Quebec studied in Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) might affect the environment. 
However, our inclusion of province by year effects adequately controls for most of these 
concerns. That is, any impact of new provincial spending programs will be picked up by 
the province-year dummies as there is no reason to expect them to have differentially 
impacted families with different numbers of children. To our knowledge, the income 
benefits are the only aspect of the program that is differentiated by the number of children.
Another problem could arise from different labor market cycles across provinces. 
However, because our identification relies on differences across families of different sizes, 
this problem only affects our strategy if province-year labor market shocks had a 
differential impact on families with one versus two versus three children.
Data
We use two data sources for the study. Our primary source for data is the National 
Longitudinal Study of Children and Youth (NLSCY).  This survey focuses on Canadian 
9children, with data currently available for six biannual waves spanning 1994-95 to 
2004-05.  The content of the survey combines extensive parent-reported health, well-being, 
and developmental information on the child and family with detailed labor market and 
income information for the parents.  The survey initially covered children aged 0 to 11 in 
wave 1 and has followed that initial cohort to ages 10 to 21 in wave 6.  Young children 
were added in each wave to fill in the gap, allowing cross-sectional coverage of all ages.
4
We use all families in each of the NLSCY waves with children ages 10 and under. 
The resulting data set comprises approximately 56,000 observations over six cycles. 
However, for many of the outcomes we examine, the variables are limited to explicit age 
ranges, making the sample sizes for the analysis considerably smaller that the full data set. 
Finally, because there is some over-sampling of children in smaller provinces, we use the 
provided weights to recover population-level results.
The NLSCY contains several variables spanning achievement measures, physical, 
and mental health including having repeated a grade, a math score, a PPVT score, having 
been diagnosed with a learning disability, measures of hyperactivity, emotional and anxiety 
disorders, physical aggression, suffering from hunger, height and weight, and mother’s 
health status.  Means and age ranges for the variables presented in each of the results 
tables.
Questions are asked of the person most knowledgeable about the child (in 92% of 
cases this is the mother) about whether the child repeated a grade in past two years. The 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test is administered to children ages 4-6 and is a widely used 
measure of cognition for preschoolers. In the NLSCY, mathematics tests were administered 
to children in grades two through ten (beyond the age limits of our sample) and are based 
4 For wave 5, cross-sectional child observations were only added in the age range 0-5.  Because the 
longitudinal cohort was ages 8-19 in wave 5, this left an unfilled gap at ages 6-7for wave 5. Similarly, there 
is an age gap in the range 6 to 9 for wave 6.
10on the Canadian Achievement Tests.  Response rates for the Math tests are slightly low and 
various researchers have investigated how these low response rates might bias analysis 
using the test scores
5 and have concluded that the low response is random, for the most 
part. The question on learning disabilities asks about whether the child has been diagnosed 
and is answered by the person most knowledgeable about the child.  The questions on 
mental and emotional health are asked of parents of all children aged 4 through 11 (we list 
the questions in the data appendix). The responses to these questions are categorized by 
disorder, and then added together to determine a hyperactivity score (8 questions), an 
emotional behavior score (8 questions), an aggressive behavior score (6 questions) an 
indirect aggression score (5 questions), and a prosocial behavior score (10 questions) for 
the child.  The mother’s depression score is again based on a series of twelve questions 
asked to the child’s mother about her feelings and behavior over the past week.
The child and mother health questions are self-reported based on a 5 point scale for 
self-assessed health of excellent to poor. We combine the bottom three measures for the 
child as very few parents report their child to be in poor health. Height and weight 
measures are also self-reported by the parent as are measures of injuries in the past twelve 
months, and reports of the child experiencing hunger because of lack of resources to buy 
food. 
Parent reports about their children are sometimes thought less reliable.  Parents may 
hold a more optimistic opinion of their child’s abilities and activities than a disinterested 
observer.  Beyond any bias in their true assessments, parents might also be reluctant to 
5 In cycle 5 the response rate for the mathematics test was 81%. Currie and Stabile (2006) discuss an 
analysis of the non-responses to the NLSCY math tests for previous cycles performed by Statistics Canada 
which reports little difference between responders and non-responders at that time. In the cycle 5 codebook, 
Statistics Canada notes that the response rate is lower in higher grades, and higher among students who 
performed well on previous cycle math tests. 
11report low achievements out of shame or embarrassment. On the other hand, differences in 
parent versus expert reports may lie in differences in information—parents may be better 
informed and thus make more accurate reports.  Evidence suggests that parent reports can 
be reliable in the spheres of motor milestones (Bodnarchuk and Eaton 2004), child health 
(Spencer and Coe 1996), and behavior and temperament (Clarke-Stewart et al. 2000). 
However, the validity of the particular measures in the NLSCY may differ from the 
measures in those studies. A common finding in the literature on validity of parent-reported 
measures is that the validity of parent-reports for acute events (such as an illness or the 
reaching of a milestone) is higher than for more general and broad questions.
6
The other survey we use is the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), 
stacking together the public-use cross sections for the years 1996 to 2004. We use this 
survey both to populate our simulation sample used to generate the simulated child benefits 
and also for validation of the predictive power of the simulated benefits. The SLID is 
conducted annually by Statistics Canada with a stratified random sampling of Canadians. 
With survey weights, the data are potentially nationally representative. The SLID provides 
detailed information on demographics, and more precise information on income and 
benefits received over the past year than the NLSCY which allows us to provide more 
complete income and benefit information to the tax calculator. In particular, the income 
measures available on the SLID are attached from the respondent’s income tax records, 
which makes them quite relevant for the tax calculator. The sample size per year is around 
35 thousand census families made up of 60 thousand individuals aged 15 and higher.
6 Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) have an extensive discussion of the measures in the NLSCY in their 
Appendix B.
12Results
The first set of results we present shows the mean benefit levels federally, 
provincially, and in total. We next explore the first stage relationship between our 
simulated child benefits and actual reported child benefits. Following the discussion of the 
first stage results, we turn to our analysis of child and family outcomes from the NLSCY. 
Our main specifications use the predicted benefits in reduced form regressions, for reasons 
made clear below. We consider the entire sample of children, as well as samples by sex of 
the child and also present results for children of mothers with lower levels of education, as 
these families are more likely to be eligible for child benefits ( as shown below). We show 
our analysis in three groups of outcome variables: education, mental and emotional 
wellbeing, and health and nutrition. We then present some results that exploit the panel 
features of the NLSCY, looking at the persistence of any effects through time. Finally, we 
present specification checks that instrument for actual benefits using the predicted benefits 
as well as uses alternate sub-samples
7. 
For all continuous variables, we have normalized the variables using the mean and 
standard deviation, so that the coefficients can be interpreted in terms of changes in 
standard deviations. The key independent variable is the dollar value of child benefits, 
expressed in thousands of dollars. All dollar values in the paper are transformed to 2004 
constant dollars.
Benefit levels 
Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviation of benefit levels at the federal and 
provincial level, as well as the total. We show the results across all observations and 
7 The models estimates here all include multiple children from the same household due to the sampling in 
the NLSCY. We have re-estimated all the models using only a single child from each family and find very 
similar results with little change in the P-values.  
13broken down by mother’s education. This is important to understand where our variation is 
coming from and to motivate our sample choices and robustness checks. The data used for 
this table is the 2004 SLID for families with a child under or at age 10, with all results in 
2004 dollars.
The first row indicates that 85 percent of Canadian families receive some child 
benefits, with an average amount of $2,174—this includes those with zero in the average. 
Not shown in the table, a breakdown by income shows that the proportion of families with 
income under $60,000 receiving some child benefits is almost 1—in the SLID takeup 
appears close to universal. Only 28.8 percent of families receive any provincial benefits, 
reflecting both more narrow income targeting and also that several provinces have no 
provincial benefit. The average benefit is only $222, but among those receiving any benefit 
it is $769. 
The last four rows break down the sample into groups by maternal highest level of 
education. For high school graduates and drop-outs, over 90 percent are receiving benefits. 
This reflects low income levels for these families, not an education-related takeup rate. 
While the proportion receiving benefits remains relatively high across all education groups, 
the average benefit does decline sharply, reflecting the phase out of benefits at higher 
income levels. The provincial benefits are positive for only 14.6 percent of families, with a 
much lower average amount. This is important because our identifying variation comes not 
from province (and family size) level variation. For higher education families, the 
provincial benefits are not sizeable. 
 First stage results 
14We begin with an analysis of the relationship between our simulated child benefits 
and actual reported child benefits.   This analysis allows us to validate the use of the 
simulated benefits in reduced form regressions (where we look for the direct effect of the 
simulated benefits on outcomes). These first stage results are performed using the person 
files of the SLID for the years 1996 to 2004.  The SLID includes a much larger sample than 
the NLSCY, is specifically designed as an income survey, and can be applied to all of the 
years over our time span of interest.  These three reasons make it a preferable data source 
for validation and estimation of our first-stage relationship.
The results appear in Table 2.  Each result in the table comes from a separate 
regression of reported child benefits on simulated benefits with a set of standard control 
variables.
8   A clustered standard error is reported beneath in parentheses.  The different 
rows of the table show results from different subsamples of the SLID data.  The columns 
show results using different formulations of the policy variable.  The first column shows 
results using a difference-in-differences specification that exploits only province-year 
variation.  The second column uses a triple-difference specification with simulated benefits 
varying on a province-year-number of children basis.  The third column is also a triple 
difference specification, but uses a measure of child benefits that adjusts for the reduction 
of welfare benefits resulting from the NCB clawback. That is, it accounts for the net 
change in income.
9
The first result is a regression using only families with a child age 0 to 17, which 
captures any families potentially eligible for child benefits.  The reported coefficient of 941 
indicates that an extra $1000 of simulated benefits is predicted to increase reported child 
8 The controls include year dummies, province dummies, number of children dummies, respondent and 
spouse education and age group dummies, a marital status indicator, and age of youngest child dummies.
9 For these simulations, families in the simulation sample who had social assistance income and were in a 
‘clawback’ province had their benefit level adjusted to account for the clawback. See Milligan and Stabile 
(2007) for details on the clawback.
15benefits by $941. The result is highly significant and indicates that the simulated benefits 
are a very precise and accurate predictor of reported child benefits. The coefficient is little-
changed in the triple difference specifications in columns two and three. The next row 
restricts the sample to children age 0 to 10, which is the age range we use for the NLSCY 
analysis to follow.  In this sample, the province-year specification shows an increase in 
actual benefits of $1,354 for every $1,000 of simulated benefits.  In the second and third 
columns, the estimated coefficient falls back under $1,000.  In the subsample containing 
only those observations where the respondent has high school education or less, the point 
estimates in the triple-difference specifications are slightly lower at $860 and $868, but 
remain highly significant.  In the sample containing only two-parent families, the results 
look very similar to the base age 0 to 10 results in the second row. In contrast, the results in 
the sample of single parents show coefficients more than twice as high, indicating that 
simulated benefits substantially underpredict actual benefits.  This may be driven by the 
fact that single-parent families have lower family income and therefore get more benefits 
than two-parent families. Because of the preponderance of two-parent families in the whole 
sample, the province-year-number of children cell averages for the simulated benefits are 
dominated by the two-parent families.
Overall, the analysis of the first stage in the SLID allows for firm confidence that 
the simulated benefits are good predictors of actual benefits. Because the coefficients are in 
most specifications relatively close to $1 for $1, reduced form estimates using the 
simulated benefits will yield results very similar to two-stage estimates using these results 
as a first stage. This diminishes the motivation for using an IV estimator over the reduced 
form specification. As a result we focus our analysis on the reduced form results using 
predicted benefits, although estimates using IV are presented for comparison. 
16Educational Outcomes
Table 3 contains the results for education outcomes.  For each dependent variable, 
we report the number of observations, the age range covered by the variable, the mean and 
standard deviation, and finally the coefficient on the benefit variable in four different 
specifications. The number of observations varies primarily because of differing age ranges 
for the dependent variables. For example, the PPVT scores are available only for children 
between ages 4 and 6.
The first row reports whether the child has ever repeated a grade. In the full sample, 
the significant coefficient of 0.013 suggests that an increase of $1,000 in simulated benefits 
leads to a 1.3 percentage point increase in the probability of having repeated a grade. This 
result does not persist in the lower education sample including both sexes, and for the 
lower education sample broken down by sex. This leaves the result inconclusive.
The math and PPVT scores show a positive, but insignificant, relationship between 
benefits and test outcomes for the entire sample. However, the  results in the low education 
sample show positive and significant relationships in both scores. For the math score, the 
coefficient is 0.074, indicating an increase of 7.4 percent of a standard deviation for an 
increase in $1,000 of benefits. The PPVT score yields a similar increase of 6.8 percent of a 
standard deviation. When compared to other results in the literature finding in the range of 
25 percent of a standard deviation for ten thousand dollars more income, the effect 
observable here is relatively large.  When the lower education sample is broken down by 
sex we find that the result is being driven by boys where the coefficients more than double. 
The effect for girls, on the other hand, is negative and insignificant. 
17The final row of Table 3 displays the result for a binary variable describing whether 
the child has been diagnosed with a learning disability, as answered by the parent. The 
mean of this variable is 0.969, reflecting the fact that very few children have been 
diagnosed with a learning disability. The estimated coefficient in the full sample is not 
statistically distinguishable from zero, but in the high school or less sample the estimated 
coefficient is a significant 1.5 percentage points. Once again, once the sample is broken 
down by sex we see that this result is driven by boys with a significant coefficient of 2.3 
percentage points, and a small and insignificant coefficient for girls. 
Overall, the evidence shows some positive impact on educational outcomes. These 
results appear to be concentrated among boys of families from lower education households 
(as measured by the educational status of mother). However, since the full sample includes 
many families who were not recipients of child benefits, we would expect any impact to be 
diluted. So, the stronger effects in the lower education sample are consistent with 
expectations. 
Mental and Emotional Wellbeing
We now turn to indicators of mental and emotional wellbeing.  Recent literature has 
highlighted the importance of early mental health problems for long-term educational and 
labour market success (Currie et al, 2008).  These dependent variables take the form of 
scores, aggregated up from responses to individual questions. We report the questions from 
the questionnaire in the appendix. These scores have been developed in accordance with 
established practices in developmental psychology. Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) 
provide some detail on studies of the validity of these measures. For the regressions, we 
have again scaled the variables by the mean and standard deviation so that coefficients 
18estimates reflect the proportion of a standard deviation resulting from a $1,000 change in 
benefits.
The first row of Table 4 shows the results for the hyperactivity-inattention score. 
There are negative coefficients of -0.03 and -0.044 in the full and low education samples, 
respectively. While the coefficient in the low education sample is larger, the standard error 
grows by even more, rendering the estimate insignificant. The second row of the table 
studies the pro-social behavior score. As can be seen in the appendix, these questions 
reflect how much the child helps other children. The coefficients here are negative, with 
significance in two out of the four columns. The coefficient in the high school or less 
sample specification is -0.082, which is relatively large, and even larger for girls in the 
sample. These results indicate that the behavior of children deteriorated with respect to 
helping other children when child benefits increased.
For emotional disorder-anxiety, the point estimates are uniformly negative, but not 
statistically significant providing little evidence of an effect here. 
The next row shows the results for conduct disorder-physical aggression, measuring 
violent acts towards others. The impact with the full sample is negative and statistically 
significant and is practically identical for the sample from lower education households. 
Once again, when we break the sample down by education it appears that this result is 
driven by the girls in the sample.  The final outcome for the child’s emotional wellbeing is 
the indirect aggression score, which measures social rather than violent conflict with other 
children. The results here show little significance except for the girls in the lower education 
sample. 
We close this analysis with an examination of the depression score of the mother. 
The depression questions are asked of the person most knowledgeable, so to keep the 
19responses consistent we selected only the mothers who were the respondent. The results for 
this dependent variable are negative and very strong, indicating a significant improvement 
on maternal depression of increased child benefits. The coefficient on simulated benefits in 
the reduced form model is -0.116, which suggests a decrease of 11.6 percent of a standard 
deviation with a $1,000 increase in benefits.
To summarize, several indicators of emotional and behavioral wellbeing indicate 
that increased child benefits improve the outcomes of children and their mothers. The 
results are particularly strong for physical aggression and for maternal depression. Pro-
social behavior, on the other hand, appears to get worse. Unlike the test score results where 
it appears that the effects are strongest for the boys from lower education households, the 
effects   on   mental   well-being   are   concentrated   among   girls   from   lower   education 
households in three of the five measures of mental health, and among the mothers of girls 
from lower education families for our measure of maternal mental health. 
Health and Nutrition
The final set of variables we analyze looks at the health outcomes of children and 
their mothers. These results are reported in Table 5, following the same format as the 
previous two tables. In the first row is a dummy variable for never having experienced 
hunger. The mean of this variable is 0.987, reflecting the fact that very few children in the 
NLSCY have ever experienced hunger. The results in the full sample show no change in 
this variable when simulated benefits increase, but in the low education sample the 
coefficient is 0.011, indicating a small improvement. In this case the result is much 
stronger among boys than girls. 
20Parent assessments of the child’s general health level show no change in the 
reduced form specifications for both sexes together, but show a negative results  for boys 
only (for this variable, the positive coefficients indicate a worsening of health). For height 
and weight, there are a few significant results but not overwhelming evidence of a large 
effect here. There is no significant change in injuries sustained over the previous 12 months 
or in maternal health indicators.
Overall, the health results show some indication that hunger is reduced, but this 
appears to have little impact on the general health of the child, although there is some 
improvement in height but not weight.   For the subsample of just boys from lower 
education household, the effects are much more pronounced with an increase in the number 
of boys who never experience hunger and improved height and overall health status. 
Persistence and lags of effects
While we observe some immediate effects of benefit income on both educational 
and health related outcomes, there may also be lags and persistence to the effects of 
income. Some benefits may require time to emerge. Others may drop off over a few years, 
suggesting that the effect of benefits on long-term outcomes would be more limited. To 
study the persistence/lags of the estimated impacts of child benefits, we regressed several 
of the measures found in the previous tables on lags of the benefit measures by exploiting 
the panel nature of the NLSCY. Specifically, we use the 1997 values of the dependent 
variables and the 1993 and 1995 benefit measures. For this exercise, we use only the full 
sample to maximize sample size as the NLSCY panel is considerably smaller than the 
complete survey.
21The results appear in Table 6. The coefficients reported in the full sample with only 
1993 benefits are in the fourth column of the table. Here, both the math and the PPVT 
scores show magnitudes very similar to what was uncovered in the contemporaneous 
analysis in Table 3. This suggests that, over a four year period, the impact of child benefits 
is similar to the contemporaneous impact. In the last two columns we include both the 1993 
and 1995 benefits in the same model. Here, for the math score it is the 1993 benefits that 
have the larger impact, with no additional gain for the 1995 benefits. In contrast, for the 
PPVT score, the impact of the 1993 benefits is estimated to be 14.4 percent of a standard 
deviation, but 10.6 percentage points of this is taken away if 1995 benefits increase. Taken 
together, this evidence suggests that the impact of child benefits on test scores is persistent.
The next three rows show the results from a selection of the behavioral scores. The 
hyperactivity result is negative and persistent when looking at the effect of 1993 benefits 
on the 1997 outcomes, even when controlling for the 1995 benefit level. For aggression, 
there is a positive impact of lagged benefits when only 1993 benefits are included, but a 
mixed result when both 1993 and 1995 are included. The maternal depression score shows 
a negative and significant impact when the 1993 benefit levels are related to the 1997 
depression scores. The impacts here remain strong and significant.
Finally, we look at the persistence of the hunger measure. The estimated impacts 
are positive, and significant for the 1993 benefits. The magnitudes here, however, are 
small.
Specification Checks:
22Table 7 presents two specification checks for our analysis. The first check uses the 
simulated benefit as an instrument for actual reported benefits where the first stage is also 
performed using the NLSCY data (and not the SLID as reported in Table 2).  The results 
are presented in the second column, with the reduced form results in the first column for 
reference purposes. The first stage fit is weaker in the NLSCY, likely reflecting the fact 
that this survey has weaker income data than the SLID. However, we continue to get 
strongly significant predictions, with $1000 of simulated benefits predicting $327 of actual 
child benefits.  The IV results are considerably different from the reduced form results. 
While most coefficients have similar signs, only a handful has similar levels of statistical 
significance. Further, the IV results are considerably larger than the OLS results. This may 
be a function of measurement error, or a somewhat poorer fit of the first stage in the 
NLSCY. Nonetheless, some results are consistent with the reduced form results including 
not being diagnosed with a learning disability, the mother’s depression score, and height. 
The second specification check examines the effects of child benefits on the 
population least likely to receive benefits and least likely to benefit from the income – 
children of university graduates. We expect that among this sub-sample, our results should 
be much weaker. While there still may be examples of university graduates who receive 
child benefits, the impact should be substantially reduced if we are estimating the true 
effect of the child benefits on outcomes. Our findings confirm this hypothesis. While we do 
find a few positive effects of the benefits (on hyperactivity, mother’s depression and 
mother’s health status) we find many fewer and smaller effects in this sub-sample, 
providing us with some additional comfort about our main findings. 
23Conclusions
In this paper, we study the impact of child benefits on measures of education, 
emotional and behavioral wellbeing, and health. We find indications that increased child 
benefits led to improved test scores, decreased aggression and maternal depression, and a 
reduction in hunger.  We test for the persistence (or lagged impact) of child benefits and 
find that the effects of benefits on educational outcomes and emotional well-being of 
children persist four years after the benefit income was received.  Our empirical approach 
based on exogenous policy changes makes us more confident these results are causal than 
has been possible with the existing, mostly correlational, literature.
A particularly striking finding in our results is the large difference between the 
effects of benefit income on boys versus girls. Further, these differences depend on the type 
of outcome being examined, although they are quite consistent within type of outcome 
(various health measures versus various education measures).  On many of our education 
and physical health measures we find considerably larger effects for boys. For many of our 
mental health variables we find considerably larger effects for girls. Finding such 
differences between sexes is consistent with evidence from other studies examining the 
impact of various programs on children of various ages (see, for example, Angrist et al 
(2006), Dynarski 2005 for differences at the college level, and Anderson (2006) for 
differences at the pre-school level. 
Most of the economics research on child benefits has focused on the labor market, 
educational, and direct-consumption aspects of increased child benefits. We take our 
findings as evidence that a broader set of outcomes should be included in any assessment 
of the costs and benefits of expanded transfer payments to families with children.  
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26Table 1: Benefit levels by education group
Federal Benefits Provincial benefits Total benefits
Greater Greater Greater
Observations than zero Amount than zero Amount than zero Amount
All observations 5134 0.850 2174 0.288 222 0.850 2396
(0.357) (2418) (0.453) (556) (0.357) (2778)
High school dropout 484 0.978 3651 0.493 403 0.978 4054
(0.146) (2821) (0.500) (733) (0.146) (3259)
High school graduate 763 0.933 2835 0.361 326 0.978 3161
(0.249) (2445) (0.481) (651) (0.249) (2870)
Some post-high school 2835 0.884 2199 0.294 211 0.884 2411
(0.320) (2369) (0.456) (527) (0.320) (2710)
University degree 1052 0.672 1103 0.146 106 0.672 1209
(0.470) (1756) (0.353) (423) (0.470) (2033)
Notes:  Data come from the 2004 SLID.The table shows the proportion of observatios with child benefits greater than 
zero and the average child benefits (including those with zero). This is repeated for federal benefits, provincial 
benefits, and total  benefits. Beneath each mean is the standard deviation in parentheses. Each row represents a 
different sample.
27Table 2: First stage results in the SLID
Nobs. (1) (2) (3)
Type of variation Province- Province- Province-
in policy varible year year-number year-number
children children,
net measure
All kids age 0-17 85396 941 905 884
(104) (105) (102)
Just kids age 0-10 55959 1354 979 966
(141) (135) (131)
Kids age 0-10 17704 980 860 868
Just highschool or less (260) (177) (179)
Kids age 0-10 45958 1373 906 889
Two parent (169) (140) (136)
Kids age 0-10 10001 1481 1947 1925
Single (559) (168) (159)
Notes: Regressions using the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.  Regressors 
include year dummies, province dummies, respondent and spouse age group dummies, 
respondent and spouse education group dummies, age of youngest child dummies, 
and a marital status indicator. The second and third columns also include interaction 
terms for province*year, year*number of children, and province*number of children.
28Table 3: Educational Outcomes
Regression coefficients
All Education groups sample High School or Less sample
Number of Age Mean Regression Both Just Just
Observations Range (Std. Dev.) coefficient Sexes boys girls
Child has ever repeated a grade 40093 4-10 0.029 0.013 -0.005 -0.011 0.001
[0.169] [0.005]* [0.007] [0.010] [0.007]
Scaled math score 17766 6-10 387.15 0.021 0.074 0.196 -0.004
[89.27] [0.019] [0.042]* [0.073]** [0.040]
Scaled PPVT score 31407 4-6 99.90 0.015 0.068 0.166 -0.037
[15.35] [0.026] [0.041]* [0.061]** [0.060]
NOT been diagnosed with 55899 6-10 0.969 0.004 0.015 0.023 0.006
learning disability [0.173] [0.004] [0.004]** [0.009]** [0.006]
Notes:  Data is the NLSCY.Table shows the number of  observations, age range, mean, and standard deviation for each 
dependent variable in the first three columns. The last four columns report coefficients on simulated benefits for a 
regression with the indicated variable as the dependent variable. Regressions include full set of control variables indicated
in text.  Standard errors are reported beneath the estimates, with one star for results significant at the 10 percent level and 
two stars for those significant at the 1 percent level of significance.
29Table 4: Mental and Emotional Wellbeing Outcomes
Regression coefficients
All Education groups sample High School or Less sample
Number of Age Mean Regression Both Just Just
Observations Range (Std. Dev.) coefficient Sexes boys girls
Hyperactivity-inattention score, 4-1162671 4-10 4.364 -0.030 -0.044 -0.042 -0.041
[3.373] [0.014] * [0.029] [0.047] [0.044]
Prosocial  behaviour score - 4-11 44977 4-10 13.068 -0.028 -0.082 -0.051 -0.104
[3.887] [0.025] [0.048]* [0.061] [0.055]*
Emotional disorder - Anxiety score, 4-11 62758 4-10 2.426 -0.043 -0.028 -0.011 -0.048
[2.411] [0.026] [0.029] [0.045] [0.039]
Conduct disorder - physical aggression score 62732 4-10 1.421 -0.051 -0.052 -0.018 -0.114
[1.868] [0.019]** [0.028]* [0.038] [0.037]**
Indirect aggression score 60238 4-10 0.994 -0.003 -0.045 -0.003 -0.100
[1.562] [0.016] [0.032] [0.033] [0.055]*
Mother's Depression Score 103722 0-10 4.568 -0.043 -0.116 -0.073 -0.150
[5.348] [0.014]** [0.023]** [0.034]* [0.032]**
Notes:  Data is the NLSCY.Table shows the number of  observations, age range, mean, and standard deviation for each 
dependent variable in the first three columns. The last four columns report coefficients on simulated benefits for a 
regression with the indicated variable as the dependent variable. Regressions include full set of control variables indicated
in text.  Standard errors are reported beneath the estimates, with one sta for results significant at the 10 percent level and 
two stars for those significant at the 1 percent level of significance.
30Table 5: Health and Nutrition Outcomes
Regression coefficients
All Education groups sample High School or Less sample
Number of Age Mean Regression Both Just Just
Observations Range (Std. Dev.) coefficient Sexes boys girls
Never experienced hunger because of lack of money to buy food 87072 2-10 0.987 0.001 0.011 0.022 0.002
[0.111] [0.002] [0.004]** [0.007]** [0.005]
In general, child is in good/fair/poor health 115910 0-10 0.118 0.003 0.006 0.020 -0.011
[0.323] [0.003] [0.006] [0.007]** [0.010]
Current height in metres and centimetres 96824 0-10 1.086 -0.004 0.023 0.051 -0.008
[0.245] [0.007] [0.011]* [0.015]** [0.021]
Current weight of child in kilograms.108796 0-10 21.225 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.011
[9.752] [0.006] 0.0130 [0.025] [0.013]
injured in last 12 months 115855 0-10 0.094 0.005 0.000 -0.012 0.009
[0.292] [0.004] [0.010] [0.013] [0.011]
Mother health status is excellent 113803 0-10 0.354 0.008 0.003 0.015 -0.004
[0.478] [0.008] [0.011] [0.017] [0.011]
Notes:  Data is the NLSCY.Table shows the number of  observations, age range, mean, and standard deviation for each 
dependent variable in the first three columns. The last four columns report coefficients on simulated benefits for a 
regression with the indicated variable as the dependent variable. Regressions include full set of control variables indicated
in text.  Standard errors are reported beneath the estimates, with one star for results significant at the 10 percent level and 
two stars for those significant at the 1 percent level of significance.
31Table 6: Persistence of effects
Number of
Observations Age Mean 1993 Benefits 1993 Benefits 1995 Benefits
Scaled math score(1997) 4603 6-10 445.20 0.057 0.058 0.005
[108.609] [0.005]** [0.014]** [0.017]
Scaled PPVT score(1997) 4052 4-6 98.72 0.052 0.144 -0.106
[15.618] [0.017]** [0.072]* [0.075]
Hyperactivity-inattention score, 4-11(1997) 9891 4-10 4.635 -0.019 -0.072 0.003
[3.591] [0.004]** [0.023]** [0.025]
Conduct disorder - physical aggression score(1997) 9908 4-10 1.387 0.018 -0.098 0.111
[1.819] [0.005]** [0.019]** [0.019]**
Mother's Depression Score(1997) 12389 0-10 4.577 -0.046 -0.064 0.008
[5.385] [0.009]** [0.021]** [0.022]
Never experienced hunger because of lack 12845 2-10 0.986 0.004 0.010 -0.005
 of money to buy food(1997) [0.117] [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Full sample Full sample
Notes:  Data is the NLSCY.Table shows the number of  observations, age range, mean, and standard deviation for each dependent variable in the 
first three columns. The next column shows the results from regressions using the 1997 value of the dependent variable and the 1993 benefit 
measure. The last two columns show the results from a regression using the 1997 dependent variable and both the 1993 and 1995 benefit measure 
in the same specification.  Regressions include full set of control variables indicated in text.  Standard errors are reported beneath the estimates, 
with one star for results significant at the 10 percent level and two starts for those significant at the 1 percent level of significance.
32Table 7: Robustness Checks
33
High School or Less University graduates
Reduced Reduced
form IV form
Reported Child Benefits -- 327 --
[116]**
Child has ever repeated a grade -0.005 -0.055 0.012
[0.007] [0.025]* [0.008]
Scaled math score 0.074 0.458 -0.071
[0.042]* [0.348] [0.036]*
Scaled PPVT score 0.068* -0.416 0.008
[0.041] [0.559] [0.055]
NOT been diagnosed with learning disability 0.015 0.071 0.014
[0.004]** [0.026]** [0.010]
Hyperactivity-inattention score, 4-11 -0.044 0.105 -0.072
[0.029] [0.190] [0.034]*
Prosocial  behaviour score - 4-11 -0.082 -0.162 -0.016
[0.048]* [0.107] [0.036]
Emotional disorder - Anxiety score, 4-11 -0.028 -0.088 -0.033
[0.029] [0.110] [0.042]
Conduct disorder - physical aggression score -0.052 0.044 -0.054
[0.028]* [0.122] [0.044]
Indirect aggression score -0.045 0.273 0.039
[0.032] [0.221] [0.050]
Mother's Depression Score -0.116 -0.600 -0.047
[0.023]** [0.409] [0.021]*
Never experienced hunger because of lack of money 0.011 0.031 -0.006
to buy food. [0.004]** [0.014]* [0.004]
In general, child is in good/fair/poor health 0.006 0.080 -0.001
[0.006] [0.036]* [0.026]
Current height in metres and centimetres 0.023 0.138 0.036
[0.011]* [0.052]** [0.040]
Current weight of child in kilograms. -0.010 -0.124 0.004
0.0130 [0.069]* [0.027]
injured in last 12 months 0.000 -0.058 -0.030
[0.010] [0.050] [0.024]
Mother health status is excellent 0.003 0.004 0.068
[0.011] [0.032] [0.027]*
Notes:  Data is the NLSCY.The table shows in the frst two columns regression coefficients for reduced form 
and instrumental variables using the less than high school sample.  The third column repeats the analysis for 
the university graduate sample. Regressions include full set of control variables indicated in text.  Standard 
errors are reported beneath the estimates, with one star for results significant at the 10 percent level and two 
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34Appendix A: National Child Benefit and Provincial Programs
Federal:
The National Child Benefit Supplement began in 1998. The rates for 2005-06 were $1,722 
annually for a first child, $1,502 for the second, and $1,420 for a third child. These rates 
are approximately triple what was in place in 1998.  The family income threshold for the 
clawback of these benefits in 2005 was $21,480.  The clawback rates were 12.2% for one 
child families, 22.8% for two child families, and 32.9% for three or more child families.
Unless otherwise mentioned, the provincial benefits described below were administered by 
the Canada Revenue Agency and integrated in one monthly payment with the federal 
CCTB and NCBS.
Several provinces reduced provincial social assistance payments dollar for dollar with the 
NCBS payments. Other provinces adjusted their social assistance payment schedule. These 
details are noted for each province below.
Newfoundland and Labrador:
The Newfoundland Child Benefit was introduced in 1999.  In 2005, the annual rate for a 
first child was $250, $326 for a second child, $350 for a third child, and $375 for a fourth 
child. The clawback of these benefits was in the income range $17,397 to $21,480. An 
additional supplement for children age zero was added in 2001. This paid $540 annually in 
2005.
Social assistance payments were not clawed back, but the adjustment for family size in 
social assistance payments was changed in 1999 when the Newfoundland Child benefit was 
introduced..
Prince Edward Island:
No child benefit program. Full reduction of NCBS payment on provincial social assistance 
payments.
Nova Scotia:
The Nova Scotia Child Benefit started in 1998.  Families with 1 to 3 children receive 
different payments. Initially in 1998, the payments ranged from $250 for the first child to 
$136 for a third (or higher) child. In 2001, the payments for third and higher children 
increased substantially.  In 2005, the payment rates were $445 annually for a first child, 
$645 for a second, and $720 for a third.  These benefits are clawed back at high clawback 
rates for incomes over $16,000.
Full reduction of social assistance payments until 2001.  After 2001, the social assistance 
payment structure for family size was adjusted instead.
35New Brunswick:
The New Brunswick Child Tax Benefit was introduced in 1997, before the national NCB 
program reached its start. The benefit is $250 per child annually, and has not changed since 
1997. The benefit is clawed back at 2.5% or 5% for family net income over $20,000.  In 
addition, there is a Working Income Supplement of $250 annually that is phased in at 4% 
for earned income over $3,750 and clawed back at a rate of 5% for family net income over 
$20,921. 
New Brunswick never reduced social assistance payments.
Quebec:
Until 1997, residents of Quebec were eligible for a family allowance, an allowance for 
young children, and an allowance for newborn children. These amounts increased with the 
number of children in the family and did not depend on family income. In 1997, these were 
combined into a new family allowance. The rates for the new family allowance were 
$2,275 per child for a single parent family and $975 per child for a two-parent family. 
These amounts were clawed back starting at incomes of $15,332 for singles and $21,825 
for two-parent families.  However, the clawback only took benefits down to a minimum 
benefit level that was $80 annually for one and two child families and $975 for three child 
families. But, for those with family net incomes higher than $50,000 these ‘minimum’ 
benefits were clawed back at a rate of 5%. In Quebec there was also an earned income 
benefit called APPORT in place from 1988 to 2004. In 2004, this benefit was phased in for 
earnings over $1,200 at a rate of 35% until an earnings level of $11,370 (two-parent) or 
$7,790 (one-parent), and then clawed back at 43% after that. At the peak benefit level the 
benefit amount was quite large, but take-up of this benefit was not high.
In 2005 a new Child Assistance program replaced the family allowance and a new Work 
Premium replaced APPORT.
There was no reduction in social assistance payments for NCBS income, but social 
assistance and other child benefits were reformed in 1997.
Ontario:
Ontario introduced the Ontario Child Care Supplement for Working Parents in 1997. The 
initial rates were $400 per child age 0 to 6, clawed back at 4% for net family income over 
$20,000. In 1998, the amounts were revamped and largely stayed the same until 2005. 
From 1998, the amount was phased in with earned income over $5000, at a rate of 20% for 
1998 and 21% from 1999 to 2005. The 2005 benefit amount was $1,100 per child age 0 to 
6 for a one-parent family and $1310 for a two-parent family. The clawback rate was 8% for 
incomes over $20,000.
Full reduction of social assistance for NCBS payments until July 2004. From 2004, the 
increments to NCBS were protected from the reduction.
36Manitoba:
There was no new benefit specifically part of the NCB program in Manitoba, but a pre-
existing benefit called CRISP was in existence since the 1980s. It required a separate 
provincial application and social assistance recipients were not eligible. In 2005, CRISP 
paid $360 annually per child, with a clawback rate of 2.083% for incomes over $12,384. 
These amounts had not changed in nominal terms since the 1980s.
Full reduction of social assistance payments for NCBS benefits until 2001. From 2001, no 
reduction for children under age 7. From 2003, no reduction for children under age 12.
Saskatchewan:
The Saskatchewan Child Benefit was introduced in 1998.  In the first year, it paid $900 
annually to a one child family, $1,104 for a second child, and $1,176 for a third. As the 
NCBS increased in the following years, the Saskatchewan Child Benefit was decreased 
downward dollar for dollar, so that by 2005 it paid only $7 annually for a 2nd child and 
$86 for a third. It is clawed back at high rates for family net incomes over $15,921. 
Additionally, there is a working income supplement in Saskatchewan. In 2005 the amount 
ranges from $2,385 for a one child family to $4,293 for a five child family.  It is phased in 
for earnings over $1,500 at rates between 25% and 45% and clawed back at a 20% rate for 
incomes over $14,640. There is a supplement for children under age 13 that pays an extra 
25% on top of the regular employment supplement.
There was no reduction in social assistance payments, but as noted above the Saskatchewan 
Child Benefit shrank dollar for dollar with NCBS increases through time.
Alberta:
Alberta has an employment-related child benefit.  It was introduced in 1997 with a phase-in 
rate of 8% for earnings over $6,500 up to a maximum of $250 for one child and $500 for 
two or more. The benefit is clawed back at a rate of 4% for incomes over $25,000. 
Between 1998 and 2004, the benefit maximum was set at $500 for one child and $1000 for 
two ore more children, but was otherwise similar to 1997. The benefit changed again for 
the 2005 year.
There is full reduction of social assistance payments for the NCBS benefits.
British Columbia:
The BC Family Bonus was introduced in 1996, two years before the NCB program. The 
Bonus rate was $1,236 per child and was clawed back at a rate of 8% for one child and 
16% for two or more for incomes higher than $18,000.  These amounts were increased to 
$1,332, 9%, 18%, and $20,500 in 2001 and have remained constant since. However, the 
NCBS is subtracted from the BC Family Bonus, rendering it to zero by 2005 since the 
NCBS is now larger than the prescribed BC Family Bonus payments. There is also a BC 
Earned Income Benefit that was introduced in 1998.  It pays differing amounts for each 
child and is phased in between earnings levels of $3,750 and $10,000. It is clawed back for 
incomes higher than $20,921 at high rates. The amounts for 2005 are $365 for the first 
child, $370 for the second, and $372 for the third or higher. Until 2003, the amount for the 
first child was $605, with $405 for the second and $330 for the third.
37There is no reduction of social assistance for the NCBS payments, but the NCBS payments 
reduced the BC Family Bonus as described above.
Appendix B: Questionnaire extracts
Mental Health Variables
1. Hyperactivity Score in  Cycle 1 (1994). Variable ABECS06. Questions:
a) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Can't sit still, is restless or hyperactive?
b)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Is distractible, has trouble sticking to any 
activity?
c)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Fidgets?
d)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Can't concentrate, can't pay attention for long?
e)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Is impulsive, acts without thinking?
f) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Has difficulty awaiting turn in games or 
groups?
g)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Cannot settle to anything for more than a few 
moments?
h) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Is inattentive?
2. Emotional Disorder Score in Cycle 1 (1994). Variable ABECS08. Questions:
a)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Seems to be unhappy, sad or depressed?
b)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Is not as happy as other children?
c)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Is worried?
d)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Cries a lot?
e)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Appears miserable, unhappy, tearful, or 
distressed?
f)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Is nervous, highstrung or tense?
g)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Has trouble enjoying %him/her%self?
h) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Is too fearful or anxious?
3. Aggression Score in Cycle 1 (1994). Variable ABECS09. Questions:
a)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Gets into many fights?
b)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: When another child accidentally hurts 
%him/her% (such as by bumping into %him/her%), assumes that the other child meant to do it, and then 
reacts with anger and fighting?
c)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Physically attacks people?
d)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Threatens people?
e)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Is cruel, bullies or is mean to others?
f)HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Kicks, bites, hits other children?
4. Prosocial Behvaiour Score in Cycle 1  (Variable:ABECS07 ) ages 4-11
The total score varies from 0 to 20, a high score indicating prosocial behavior 
a) Using the answers never or not true, sometimes or somewhat true, or often or very true, how often would you 
say that %fname%:  shows sympathy to someone who has made a mistake?
b) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Will try to help someone who has been hurt?
c)  HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Volunteers to help clear up a mess someone else 
has made?
d) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: If there is a quarrel or dispute, will try to stop it?
38e) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Offers to help other children (friend, brother or 
sister) who are having difficulty with a task?
f) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Comforts a child (friend, brother, or sister) who is 
crying or upset?
g) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Spontaneously helps to pick up objects which 
another child has dropped (e.g. pencils, books, etc.)?
h) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Will invite bystanders to join in a game?
i) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Helps other children (friends, brother or sister) who 
are feeling sick?
j) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: Takes the opportunity to praise the work of less able 
children?
5. Indirect Aggression Score in Cycle 1 ages 4-11
The total score varies from 0 to 10, a high score indicating behavior associated with indirect 
aggression. 
a) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: When mad at someone, tries to get others to dislike 
that person?
b) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: When mad at someone, becomes friends with 
another as revenge?
c) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: When mad at someone, says bad things behind the 
other's back?
d) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: When mad at someone, says to others: let's not be 
with him/her?
e) HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY THAT %FNAME%: When mad at someone, tells the other one's secrets 
to a third person?
6. Adult Health Depression Score
a) HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I did not 
feel like eating; my appetite was poor.
1 RARELY OR NONE OF THE TIME (LESS THAN 1 DAY) 
2 SOME OR A LITTLE OF THE TIME (1-2 DAYS) 
3 OCCASIONALLY OR A MODERATE AMOUNT OF TIME (3-4 DAYS) 
4 MOST OR ALL OF THE TIME (5-7 DAYS)
b) HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I felt that 
I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends.
c) HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I had 
trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.
d) HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I felt 
depressed.
e)HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I felt that
everything I did was an effort.
f) HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I felt 
hopeful about the future.
g) HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: My sleep 
was restless.
h)HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I was 
happy.
39i)HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I felt 
lonely.
FREQ WTD
j)HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I enjoyed 
life.
k)HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I had 
crying spells.
l) HOW OFTEN YOU HAVE FELT OR BEHAVED THIS WAY DURING THE PAST WEEK: I felt that 
people disliked me.
40